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IS LESS REALLY MORE?  HALL STREET ASSOCIATES, PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING 
AND EXPANDED REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN STATE COURTS  
 
Allen Blair

 
 
 
You’re flying on a trapeze without a safety net.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration can be a risky business.  The lack of judicial oversight combined with 
wide-sweeping arbitrator power to grant relief sometimes leaves parties feeling 
vulnerable to excessive or flatly wrong judgments.  In “bet the farm” cases, parties, or 
one of them, might crave the safety of a second set of eyes reviewing their awards.
2
  
Accordingly, parties occasionally incorporate provisions for expanded judicial review 
into their arbitral agreements.   
But a fear of finality chafes, in the Supreme Court’s view, against an important 
feature of arbitration, the ease of judicial enforcement paired with highly constrained 
grounds for the vacatur of awards.
3
  Indeed, according to the Court in Hall Street 
                                                 

 I would like to thank Tom Carbonneau, Nancy Welsh, my co-contributors, and all of the students and 
staff at Penn State University for their support and warm hospitality at the Symposium where the first draft 
of this article was first presented.  
1
 Joanna Lin, $4 Billion Award May Be Record in Arbitration Case, L.A. DAILY J., June 5, 2009 
(Verdicts and Settlements), at 2 (quoting Jay McCauley, a corporate lawyer, who went on to add that “[w]e 
still like the benefits of arbitration . . . but boy, maybe we should think twice about having no safety net at 
all, no chance when things go wayward”). 
2
 See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 40, Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008) 
(No. 06-989) (arguing that the concern is that many business managers may lose their appetite for 
arbitration by requiring them to “bet the company” on a process with no prospect of meaningful review); 
see also, e.g., Stephen P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 241, 241 (1999) (recognizing “a growing concern over the ‘Russian Roulette’ 
nature of arbitration”); Carroll E. Neesemann, Contracting for Judicial Review: Party-chosen Arbitral 
Review Standards Can Inspire Confidence in the Process, and is Good for Arbitration, 5 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 18, 18 (1998) (expressing concern over “knucklehead awards”).  In Part IV, I discuss some recent 
evidence that suggests that many commercial parties are growing more hesitant about using arbitration to 
resolve at least their biggest disputes precisely because they are concerned about limited review.  See infra 
Part IV(B).  
3
 As the Tenth Circuit said in Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 
 
We would reach an illogical result if we concluded that the FAA’s policy of ensuring 
judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements is well served by allowing for expansive 
judicial review after the matter is arbitrated. The FAA’s limited review ensures judicial 
respect for the arbitration process and prevents courts from enforcing parties’ agreements 
to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results of the arbitration. These limited standards 
manifest a legislative intent to further the federal policy favoring arbitration by 
preserving the independence of the arbitration process. 
 
254 F.3d 925, 935 (10th Cir. 2001); see also, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking 
Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383, 425 (2009) (describing the “spare legal 
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Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., the efficiency of finality trumps even contractual 
freedom.  Parties cannot choose in their contracts to expand review of arbitral awards 
under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
4
   
The oddity of Hall Street’s holding might not be evident if the case is examined 
only in the context of arbitration law.  Although the Court paternalistically substituted its 
own view of what was best for the parties in the face of clearly expressed language to the 
contrary,
5
 thereby tacking away from the course set by its previous cases,
6
 the decision 
purported to be strongly pro-arbitration.  It recited much the same supportive language of 
other Supreme Court cases and proclaimed itself to be “substantiating a national policy 
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential 
virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”7  Moreover, using wholesome doctrines like 
ejusdem generis and the Whole Act Rule, the Court’s conclusions rested on 
straightforward statutory analysis of the FAA.
8
  Accordingly, although courts and 
commentators debated the propriety of contractually expanding judicial review of arbitral 
awards prior to Hall Street,
9
 comparatively little critical attention has been paid to the 
issue in the four years since the case was decided.
10
  
                                                 
framework” for the judicial enforcement of arbitral awards as resting on a “keystone” of “rigorously 
restrained . . . judicial confirmation, modification, or vacatur of arbitration awards”) (citing Amy J. 
Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 
123, 189-90 (2002)). 
4
 Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 592. 
5
 At issue in the case was a contract provision providing that:  
 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon may enter judgment upon any 
award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. 
The Court shall vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s findings of 
facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the arbitrator's conclusions 
of law are erroneous.  Hall Street Assocs., 552 U.S. at 579. 
 
6
 See infra Part II(E). 
7
 Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 577. 
8
 See Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1103, 1120-21 (2010).  It is worth pointing out that the Court’s strong focus on simple statutory 
construction might itself seem odd.  Over the past twenty-five years, the Court has effectively rewritten the 
FAA, very often paying almost no heed to the statute’s language or history.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, 
the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], 
building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation....”); Thomas Carbonneau, Symposium 
Introduction: Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 983, 986 (2009) (“In its 
decisional law, the Court systematically rewrote the U.S. or Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).”); Margaret L. 
Moses, ArbitrationLaw: Who’s in Charge?, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 147 (2010) (“The Supreme 
Court’s construction of the statute, especially in the last twenty-five years, amounts to a judicially created 
legislative program, imposed without congressional input, that has vastly expanded the reach and focus of 
the original statute.”). 
9
 Hall Street resolved a Circuit split.  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits had found that parties could not, 
through a private agreement, either expand or contract the powers of a court presiding over their dispute.  
See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 
cert. dism'd, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004) (finding that any contractual provision purporting to expand grounds on 
which court can vacate arbitral award is ineffectual, regardless of its wording; FAA defines judicial scope 
of review by statute, which private parties have “no power to alter or expand”); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline 
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Hall Street, however, is part of a bigger story and its place in that story is 
puzzling.  In addition to countering the principle of party choice in the context of 
arbitration,
11
 Hall Street also bucked a more general precedential trend embracing private 
procedural ordering.
12
 In recent decades, the Court has permitted parties to customize 
                                                 
Co., 254 F.3d 925, 934-37 (10th Cir. 2001) (same).  The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits, in contrast, had 
found that parties had the power to define, through their contract, the underlying arbitral award itself and 
thus could contract for expanded judicial review.  See Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 64 
F.3d 993, 996-97 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that “a contractual modification [of judicial review] is acceptable 
because, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, arbitration is a creature of contract and the FAA’s pro-
arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties”); Puerto Rico 
Tel. Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005) (adopting the Gateway rule); 
Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); see also Prescott v. 
Northlake Christian Sch., 369 F.3d 491, 494-498 (5th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming the Gateway rule). 
Not surprisingly, given this clear divide in the case law, a number of commentators weighed in as well.  
For several particularly good scholarly treatments of the subject, see, e.g., Eric Chafetz, The Propriety of 
Expanded Judicial Review Under the FAA: Achieving a Balance Between Enforcing Parties’ Agreements 
According to Their Terms and Maintaining Arbitral Efficiency, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2006); 
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. 
L.J. 214 (2007); Ilya Enkishev, Above the Law: Practical and Philosophical Implications of Contracting 
for Expanded Judicial Review, 3 J. AM. ARB. 61 (2004); Lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of 
Arbitration Awards, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 171 (2003); Ann C. Hodges, Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards on Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case Law, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 91 (2000); 
Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of Arbitration Authority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 
81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99 (2007); Margaret M. Maggio & Richard A. Bales, Contracting Around the FAA: 
The Enforceability of Private Agreements to Expand Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 18 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 151 (2002); Margaret Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 429 (2004); Bret F. Randall, The History, Application, and 
Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759 
(1992); Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration's Finality Through Functional 
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123 (2002); Kevin A. Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial 
Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002); Stephen 
P. Younger, Agreements to Expand the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 63 ALB. L. REV. 
241 (1999). 
10
 For excellent post-Hall Street commentary, however, see, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting 
Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 914 (2010); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues 
of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 
(2010); Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 535-36 (2009); David K. Kessler, Why 
Arbitrate? The Questionable Quest for Efficiency in Arbitration After Hall Street Associates, 8 FLA. ST. U. 
BUS. REV. 77 (2009); Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next?, 31 
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273 (2009); Alan Scott Rau, Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc.: Fear of 
Freedom, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 469 (2006); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After 
Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Timothy Tyler & Archis A. Parasharami, Finality over 
Choice: Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Court), 25 J. INT’L ARB. 613 (2008). 
11
 See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1103, 1105 (2010) (recognizing that Hall Street “constitutes arguably the most significant constraint 
on party autonomy in arbitration that the Court has imposed”). 
12
 Private procedural ordering allows parties to bargain over the procedural rules that will govern the 
resolution of any disputes that might arise between them in the future.  See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits 
of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 724-25 (2011) (describing the process of modifying 
by contract the “spectrum of procedure” as private procedural ordering).  Following the lead of other 
commentators who have described this form of private ordering, I will use the terms “private procedural 
ordering” and “procedural contracting” interchangeably.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
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more and more dispute resolution procedures and processes.  The Court has, in short, 
recognized the advantages of seeing procedures and processes as defaults rather than 
immutable or mandatory rules.
13
  The expanding regime of private procedural ordering 
offers parties additional means of calibrating accuracy and efficiency to meet their ex 
ante preferences.
14
  The extreme outlying character of Hall Street becomes clear when 
one considers that it is one of the only decisions in the last thirty years by the Supreme 
Court invalidating a procedural contract.
15
 
Seen in this light, Hall Street represents a distinct break in the Court’s otherwise 
relatively unfettered march to internalize contract norms and abandon its historic 
skepticism over the devolution of judicial authority.
16
  It might be tempting to read the 
case as a cautionary break, halting the march in order to consider some of the many and 
concerning repercussions of converting public and standardized procedure into private 
and individualized procedure.
17
  But such a reading does not fit.  The holding strives to 
limit rather than expand a judicial role in an otherwise private proceeding.  Besides, the 
case does not even hint that its rejection of private procedural ordering springs from any 
concerns over party control of judicial processes.  
                                                 
80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 598 (2005) (recognizing a movement from “Due Process Procedure to 
Contract Procedure”).  Unlike some commentators, however, I am using these terms in the broadest 
possible sense, to include all party agreements regarding resolution of their disputes, including procedures 
that may be used in courts and extra-judicial procedures and processes such as arbitration, mediation, med-
arb and settlement.  Compare Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure,  53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 507, 511 (2011) (describing contract procedure as “the practice of setting out procedures in 
contracts to govern disputes . . . that will be adjudicated in the public courts”). 
13
 The “rules versus standards” debate has occupied the attentions of scholars for many years.  See, 
e.g., David L. Faigman, Constitutional Adventures in Wonderland: Exploring the Debate Between Rules 
and Standards Through the Looking Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (1993) 
(“The amount of ink spilled over debating the virtues of rules versus standards would lead the reasonable 
observer to believe that something momentous was at stake.”).  For good contemporary discussions of the 
distinction, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 557-68 
(1992) (viewing rules and standards for their economic efficiency); Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining 
Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995) (examining relative efficiency of 
two-party bargaining under rules and standards); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal 
Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 25 (2000) (“Rules establish legal boundaries based 
on the presence or absence of well-specified triggering facts.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules 
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 (1992) (“Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving 
irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out elsewhere.”); Mary C. Daly, The 
Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of 
Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117, 1124-42 
(1999); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER 13-29 (2009) (discussing the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of legal norms being articulated as rules or standards). 
14
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUDIES 307, 314 (1994) (arguing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can only be obtained at 
higher costs so an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case basis). 
15
 See Jamie Dodge, supra note 12, at 738 (describing Hall Street as “[t]he Court’s sole invalidation of 
a procedural term”). 
16
 See Judith Resnik, supra note 12, at 598--99 (describing how changes in adjudicatory practice are 
shifting the focus of civil procedure from “due process procedure” to “contract procedure”). 
17
 See infra Part II(D). 
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The better explanation, I contend, is that the Court was not rejecting private 
procedural ordering at all.
19
  Rather, its somewhat tepid reference to alternative means of 
enforcing contracts for expanded judicial review of arbitral awards – “[t]he FAA is not 
the only way into court for parties wanting review of arbitration awards: they may 
contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law, for example, where 
judicial review of different scope is arguable”20 – suggests that the Court was instead 
trying to funnel innovation, at least with respect to arbitral award enforcement and 
review, back to the states.  Less judicial review under the FAA could result in more use 
of state arbitration laws, which might allow for greater party autonomy.   
In this Article, I examine the implications of this reading.  I argue that barring 
expanded judicial review under the FAA but inviting parties to turn to state law to 
achieve their objectives erodes the value of arbitration and threatens its continued 
relevance, at least to domestic commercial disputes.
21
  Hall Street is the worst of all 
possible worlds: it undermines party autonomy while simultaneously threatening the very 
virtue – finality –  that it was crafted to protect. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part II begins by tracing the evolution and 
current status of private procedural ordering.  Additionally, it evaluates some of the ways 
in which private procedural ordering generally, and expanded judicial review of arbitral 
awards in particular, offers the potential for significant efficiency gains.  Set against the 
potential gains from customized procedure and process, however, are several possible 
externalities, which Part II also surveys.   Part II concludes that Hall Street is best 
                                                 
19
 Professor Jamie Dodge, in her seminal article on private procedural ordering makes this point as 
well.  In her view,  
 
[A]lthough the Court narrowly held in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc. that the 
Federal Arbitration Act specifically preempted the modification of the standard of review 
in the courts, the Court expressly noted that under state law or common law parties may 
be able to modify the standard of judicial review. 
 
Jamie Dodge, supra note 12, at 738.  This “express notation” suggests, in her view, that the Court 
does not fundamentally think parties should be barred from contracting for expanded judicial 
review or similar procedural modifications.  See id. 
20
 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008). 
21
 Of course, arbitration is also under attack in the consumer and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the 
employment context.  Although the 2009 Arbitration Fairness Act has, to date, failed to pass in Congress, 
the Act’s spirit has persisted and shows signs that it might erode at least some of the Supreme Court’s pro-
arbitration precedent.  Congress has, in fact, enacted several “mini” versions of the Act applying to parties 
with weaker bargaining power.  See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454 (2009) (banning in certain defense contractors’ employment 
agreements pre-dispute provisions to arbitrate sexual harassment claims); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 748(n)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010) (to be 
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2)); id. §§ 922(b), (c), 124 Stat. at 1841 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1514A(e)(1), (2)) (prohibiting pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims under whistleblower provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act).  Perhaps more significantly, in April 2012, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau began soliciting comments relevant to its upcoming investigation of mandatory 
arbitration provisions in agreements for financial products and services.  See, e.g., Ann Carrns, Consumer 
Agency Looking Into Mandatory Arbitration, NEW YORK TIMES (April 25, 2012), available at 
http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/25/consumer-agency-looking-into-mandatory-arbitration/. 
Congress specifically required such an investigation in Section 1028(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act.    
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understood not as a decision opposing private procedural ordering but rather as pressing 
for state court innovations, at least with respect to agreements for expanded judicial 
review of arbitral awards.   
Part III turns to a survey of state law.  It observes that, although a majority of 
jurisdictions have arbitration laws providing for essentially identical enforcement and 
review as the FAA, there are signs that states have started to accept Hall Street’s 
invitation.  Five states allow parties to contract for expanded judicial review.  A handful 
of additional states have laws allowing for more searching judicial review of arbitral 
awards. 
Part IV considers the problems with Hall Street’s holding paired with its 
invitation for more reliance on state laws.  It argues that a greater role for state arbitration 
laws in the enforcement and review of awards sits awkwardly with extant Supreme Court 
cases that have, with very few exceptions, federalized and standardized arbitration law.  
Indeed, the prospect of a greater role for state law opens the back door for states to thwart 
the purposes of the FAA by enacting more intrusive and disparate review standards, 
which, as Part III suggests, seems already to be happening.  Given current state law, it is 
not clear that the Supreme Court, when pushed, will actually stick by its dicta in Hall 
Street.  Even if it does, parties will be faced with an increasingly confusing and 
overlapping matrix of competing state laws as well as the FAA.  Accordingly, parties 
who could benefit most from arbitration will be stymied by legal uncertainty and high 
transaction costs, which potentially reduce or eliminate any efficiency gains.  Given that 
arbitration is no longer the only game around for commercial parties who wish to contain 
costs and exercise control over the course of their disputes with one another – they can, 
instead, use other procedural contracting options to shape the course of future litigation – 
Hall Street threatens the continued relevance of arbitration, at least to domestic 
commercial disputes. 
II. THE RISE OF PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING 
I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the 
people themselves.
22
 
 
Historically, courts were skeptical of any private procedural choices, seeing such 
party-driven rulemaking as supplanting the public function of courts.
23
 In the nineteenth 
and much of the early twentieth centuries, courts were not only reluctant to enforce non-
judicial modes of dispute resolution like arbitration, but they also effectively prevented 
                                                 
22
 PHILLIP G. HENERSON, THE PRESIDENCY THEN AND NOW 25 (2000) (quoting Thomas Jefferson 
writing to William Charles Jarvis, 28 September 1820). 
23
 Several scholars have suggested that at least some of this hostility towards private procedural 
ordering might have been less high-minded.  Professor Alan Scott Rau, for instance, has suggested that 
courts’ traditional hostility to arbitration may have “originated in considerations of competition for 
business, at a time when judges’ salaries still depended on fees paid by litigants.”  ALAN SCOTT RAU, 
ARBITRATION 57 (2d ed. 2002); see also JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 
83 (1918) (recognizing the judicial competition with private tribunals and the fear that arbitration 
threatened a significant source of judicial business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts’ caseloads). 
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private parties from altering or opting out of almost all procedural rules in judicial 
proceedings.
24
  As one commentator has colorfully suggested, courts followed Henry 
Ford’s view of choice: “Any customer can have a car painted any colour that he wants so 
long as it is black.”25 
Eventually, however, starting with a somewhat grudging acceptance of arbitration 
and the passage of the FAA but really gaining momentum under Chief Justices Warren 
and Burger, judicial tides began to shift.  Through an expanding menu of private 
procedural ordering options, courts have allowed parties the freedom to tailor process and 
procedure in order to increase certainty while efficiently adjusting accuracy to fit with 
their ex ante preferences.
26
   
The following sections briefly trace the evolution of the current law governing 
private procedural ordering and discuss the potential gains from such ordering.  This Part 
then highlights some of the normative implications of party choice over procedural rules.  
The last section in this Part concludes that whatever legitimate concerns may exist with 
respect to private procedural ordering, the trend of precedent has been clear: the Supreme 
Court favors parties’ ability to structure their own procedural rules.  Hall Street is then 
best understood not as a departure from this trend but rather as an effort to direct a 
particular type of innovation in private procedural ordering back to state courts. 
A. Procedure as Public Law: Historic Skepticism of Private Procedural 
Ordering 
Until the early twentieth century, courts protected their turf.  They tended to see 
efforts by parties to provide for private procedural rules or most non-court dispute 
resolution processes as infringements on the proper public role of the court system.
27
  
There existed “a taboo against party autonomy in procedural matters.”28   Courts 
                                                 
24
 See, e.g., Michael Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial 
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 139 n.17 (1982) (citing Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
445, 451 (1874)) (discussing how the ouster doctrine resulted in courts refusing to enforce forum selection 
clauses). 
25
 Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007) (arguing that “[o]ur judiciary has unfortunately embraced Henry 
Ford’s sense of consumer choice” with respect to litigation procedural rules). 
26
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, supra note 14, at 310 (arguing that heightened accuracy in adjudication can 
only be obtained at higher costs so an efficient balance has to be struck on a case-by-case basis). 
27
 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 
TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 (1996) (recognizing that prior to the early twentieth century, the traditional view 
was that if courts were to function as the national source of justice, there was no room for “makeshift, 
party-confected modes of dispute resolution”); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action 
Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 577, 599–600 (1997) (noting that judges were 
either wary of quality of justice available in arbitration or—because they were paid on per case basis—
protective of their own pocketbooks); but see Michael H. LeRoy, Crowning the New King: The Statutory 
Arbitrator and the Demise of Judicial Review, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 20 (2009) (surveying treatises and 
concluding that “English and American colonial courts were neither hostile nor blindly deferential to 
arbitration”). 
28
 Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 294 (1988). 
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primarily relied on two interlacing doctrines – the revocability and ouster doctrines – to 
prevent procedural contracting.  Perhaps not surprisingly, both doctrines arose out of a 
judicial skepticism of arbitration, though at least the ouster doctrine expanded to bar other 
forms of private procedural ordering as well. 
The revocability doctrine sprung into existence, near full gown, from dicta in 
Lord Edward Coke’s 1609 opinion in Vynior’s Case.29  There, the parties had entered into 
a contract for repair work on several buildings.
30
  They agreed to submit any disputes 
about the work to arbitration, and, as was customary at the time, a performance bond 
secured this agreement.
31
  The plaintiff brought a court action, seeking to recover on the 
bond as well as to recover damages.  The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had failed 
to comply with the arbitration agreement.
32
 Lord Coke ruled that when there was a suit on 
a bond given for a submission to arbitration, the submission itself was revocable although 
the price of revoking was forfeiture of the bond: 
 
Although . . . the defendant, was bound in a bond to stand to, abide, 
observe, etc., the rule, etc., of arbitration, etc., yet he might countermand 
it, for one cannot by his act make such authority, power, or warrant not 
countermandable which is by the law or of its own nature 
countermandable.
33
 
 
 Whatever Lord Coke’s original intent,34 Vynoir’s became a leading case 
“establishing the revocability doctrine.”35  Pursuant to this doctrine, a party to an 
arbitration agreement could revoke an arbitrator’s authority at any time before the 
arbitrator rendered an award, even if the parties had agreed the delegation was 
irrevocable.
36
  Although U.S. courts would usually enforce arbitration awards once 
                                                 
29
 Vynior v. Wilde, [1609] 77 Eng. Rep. 595, 598-600 (K.B.).  
30
 See id. 
31
 See id.  The common law of contract was just beginning to form at the time, so bonds often secured 
contractual promises.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract 
Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
207, 208 (2004) (noting that “the common law of contract was in its infancy” at the time that Vynior v. 
Wilde was decided). 
32
 See Vynior, 77 Eng. Rep. at 597. 
33
 Id. at 601-02 (emphasis added). 
34
 Some commentators have suggested that Lord Coke was effectively relying on agency principles.  
See, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 598-99 (1928).  
Professors Paul Carrington and Paul Castle have compellingly, pointed out, however, that the concept of 
agency had not developed at the time that Vynoir’s was decided.  See Carrington & Castle, supra note 31, at 
210.  They contend, instead, that Lord Coke was likely motivated by a desire to “insure the disinterest of 
arbitrators” at a time when there were no real substantive constraints on arbitrator authority.  Id.   
35
 Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the 
Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 238, 240 (1930); see also, e.g., Paul L. Sayre, Development of 
Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 602 (1928). 
36
 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (citing Vynior as 
authority for the proposition that arbitration submissions are revocable regardless of a stipulation to the 
contrary because one “cannot alter the judgment of law, to make that irrevocable, which is of its own nature 
revocable.”). 
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issued,
37
 following the practice of their English counterparts, they would not generally 
enforce executory contracts to arbitrate.
38
  Practically, this meant that a party to an 
arbitration agreement faced continual risk that her counterparty would renege on his 
promise and exercise his right to demand that a court hear any disputes. 
 Still, the revocability doctrine alone did not necessarily create an insuperable 
barrier to arbitration or other forms of procedural contracting.  The doctrine mutated, 
however, over time into the so-called ouster doctrine.  The mutation can be traced to an 
eighteenth century English decision, Kill v. Hollister.
39
  There, while interpreting the 
revocability doctrine, the court allowed a judicial action over an insurance policy to 
proceed despite an arbitration clause on the grounds that “the agreement of the parties 
cannot oust this court [of jurisdiction].”40  As with the dicta giving rise to the revocability 
doctrine itself, no authority was given for this “ouster” rule.41  Nevertheless, by 1856, the 
rule had become justified as legitimate “judicial jealousy” over jurisdiction, and this 
explanation for it stuck.
42
     
 Although the ouster doctrine began as anti-arbitration rule, it quickly expanded 
into a more general principle precluding courts from enforcing various contractual 
provisions limiting redress in courts.  In Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, for instance, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that an agreement by which an insurance company waived its 
right to remove state cases to federal courts was not enforceable.
43
  The Court analogized 
the matter to a jury trial waiver and an arbitration agreement, concluding that: 
 
A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, [sic] or his substantial 
rights . . . . He cannot . . . bind himself in advance by an agreement, which 
may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on 
all occasions, whenever the case may be presented.
44
 
 
In the Court’s view, privately negotiated contract provisions could not trump the role of 
the public adjudicatory system.  If such contract provisions were enforced, the “regular 
                                                 
37
 See, e.g, Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). 
38
 See, e.g., Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121-22 (1924) (“The federal courts--
like those of the states and of England--have, both in equity and at law, denied in large measure, the aid of 
their processes to those seeking to en force (sic) executory agreements to arbitrate disputes.”); Jeffery W. 
Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 272 
(1990).  This rule was incorporated in the First Restatement of Contracts as well.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 550, cmt. A (1932) (“A bargain to arbitrate, though it is not illegal, is practically 
unenforceable. . . .”).  Of course, even at the height of its power, the revocability doctrine had exceptions.  
See, e.g., Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. at 122-25 (finding that New York courts could equitably enforce 
arbitration agreements in their own courts under New York’s arbitration statute). 
39
 Kill v. Hollister, [1746] 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B.). 
40
 Id. 
41
 See id. 
42
 See Scott v. Avery, [1856] 10 Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (H.L.) (speculating that judicial hostility to 
arbitration “probably originated in the contests of the different courts in ancient times for extent of 
jurisdiction, all of them being opposed to anything that would deprive one of them of jurisdiction”); Home 
Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (citing Scott v. Avery as one of “numerous cases” showing that 
parties cannot by contract oust a court of jurisdiction). 
43
 Home Ins. Co., 87 U.S. at 451-52. 
44
 Id. at 451. 
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administration of justice might be greatly impeded . . . .”45  Soon, courts went on to find 
that anti-suit covenants, pre-dispute waivers of liability, and forum selection clauses were 
similarly barred by the ouster doctrine.
46
  Only courts, the prevailing opinion went, 
possessed the ability to “protect rights and to redress wrongs” because private tribunals or 
other private customizations of procedure were prone to “become . . . instrument[s] of 
injustice, or to deprive parties of rights which they are otherwise fairly entitled to have 
protected.”47  
B. More than Mere Contract Law: Autonomy and Private Procedural Ordering 
By the late Eighteen-century, although both the revocability and ouster doctrines 
were still in use in American courts, notions of party autonomy were starting to play a 
greater role in not only the public conscience but also in the judicial mind.
48
  At the 
height of the revocability and ouster doctrines, contract law was in its infancy, and most 
contracts were discrete and simple.
49
  That began to change with rapid economic 
                                                 
45
 Id. at 451-52. 
46
 See, e.g., Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 F. 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1897) 
(finding that a contract stipulating that suits could only be brought in federal court was void because it 
“intended to oust the jurisdiction of all state courts”); Knorr v. Bates, 35 N.Y.S. 1060, 1062 (N.Y. Gen. 
Term. 1895) (holding that a contractual limitation on the right to sue underwriters on an insurance policy 
was unenforceable because “a provision in a contract that the party breaking it shall not be answerable in an 
action is a stipulation for ousting the courts of jurisdiction, and as such, is void, upon grounds of public 
policy”); Meacham v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (N.Y. 1914) 
(Cardozo, J. concurring) (finding that an arbitration contract is an invalid attempt to oust the jurisdiction of 
the courts because its purpose is the same as agreements requiring litigants to submit their case to a foreign 
court, but noting that there may be exceptional circumstances warranting enforcement of such forum 
selection clauses). 
47
 Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1320-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  Thus, it is fair to say that 
the ouster doctrine was justified both based on concerns over individual rights, such as those set out in 
Morse, and concerns about extra-individual matters such as “administrative efficiency, separation of 
powers, and public faith in the legitimacy of the judiciary.”  David Marcus, The Perils of Contract 
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 
(2008) (citing and discussing Nute v. Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. 174 (1856) as articulating this 
extrajudicial concern). 
48
 See, e.g., Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 
415, 415 (1988) (“During the past century, contract law, along with most of American society, has 
undergone a ‘major transformation.’”); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 630 (1995) (“Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern American 
law.”). 
49
 In his article on the history of commercial law in the United States, Professor Walter F. Pratt, Jr. 
explains that: 
 
Contracting, like conversation, had in earlier times been rooted in the past. People who knew one 
another and who knew the local market, insulated as it was from dramatic shifts in the economy, 
faced little likelihood of changes in circumstances that would require elaborate agreements or 
provoke complex disputes. Railroads and cities, however, seemed to disrupt that past by bringing 
economic uncertainty into the local markets. Parties thus faced the tiring prospect of writing detail 
upon detail into each agreement if they were to account for every potential event. 
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transformations in the American economy.  As American courts routinely decided 
increasingly complex contract disputes based on the intentions of the parties,
50
 the same 
principles of autonomy began gaining traction in the context of private procedural 
ordering.
51
  The trend towards acceptance of procedural contracts, in fact, follows the 
path charted by G. Richard Shell twenty years ago in his study of contracts and the 
Supreme Court: the steady demise of the public policy exception to contract enforcement 
and, in particular, of an exception to contractual autonomy that draws from the special 
attributes of judicial process.
52
 
Arguably, the first steps towards unlocking the potential of private procedural 
ordering started with increasing demand for arbitration.
53
  Businesses saw the potential 
efficiency gains from arbitration, but they were frustrated with court refusal to enforce 
arbitration agreements.
54
  Responding to the interests of the business community, in 
1920, New York broke from traditional English arbitration law by enacting a statute that 
enforced pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate, ended the practice of courts hearing 
questions of law during the course of arbitration, and provided for only limited judicial 
review of the final award.
55
  In 1925, the U.S. Congress followed New York’s lead by 
enacting the United States Arbitration Act, later renamed the Federal Arbitration Act.  
Accordingly, as the Supreme Court explained, the FAA was a “response to the refusal of 
                                                 
Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn of the Century, 39 S.C. L. REV. 415, 428-29 
(1988); see also Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration on the Development 
of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 489 (1995) (explaining that the doctrine of 
revocability set forth by Lord Coke in Vynior occurred before the common law of contracts was fully 
formed). 
50
 Instead of being localized and discrete as they had been prior to the turn of the century, commercial 
transactions tended to be more complex and regional as well as national.  See Allen Blair, “You Don’t Have 
to be Ludwig Wittgenstein”: How Llwellyn’s Concept of Agreement Should Change the Law of Open-
Quantity Contracts, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 67, 77 (2006).   
51
 Contra David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 1014 (2008)  (arguing that, although “[i]ncreased 
appreciation for freedom of contract and individual autonomy and consent may have influenced the 
development of [forum selection clauses,] . . . these considerations played a small part, at best, especially 
when compared to the degree to which extraindividual concerns shaped the design of clause enforcement 
doctrine”). 
52
 G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern Supreme Court, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 431, 452-56 (1993) 
(detailing Supreme Court treatment of judicial access clauses and documenting judicial acceptance of ex 
ante forum selection clauses). 
53
 See, e.g., William C. Jones, An Inquiry Into the History of the Adjudication of Mercantile Disputes in 
Great Britain and the United States, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 461-62 (1958) (“Statistics are not available 
and it is doubtful that they ever will be, but it is probable that in the nineteenth century arbitration in one 
form or another became the most important form of mercantile dispute settlement ... in the United States ... 
although courts continued, of course, to be used.”); Jeffery W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case 
of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 275 (1990) (“Despite an essentially unchanging 
judicial hostility toward arbitration, it grew in popularity as the commercial affairs of the United States 
became increasingly far flung and complex.”). 
54
 See, e.g., Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (recognizing the 
general displeasure in the business community with courts' unwillingness to enforce arbitration agreements 
in the early twentieth century). 
55
 Michael A. Scodro, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 YALE 
L.J. 1927, 1941 (1996). 
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courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements,”56 but it also represented a more 
general step towards recognizing the value of autonomy in procedural choices.   
That progression continued and, as due process became recognized as a waivable 
right, the Warren and Burger Courts tentatively embraced more and more forms of 
procedural private ordering.
57
  The current era customizable procedure, however, was not 
ushered in until 1972 in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
58
 when the Supreme Court 
addressed enforcement of a forum selection clause for the first time since it had endorsed 
the ouster doctrine in Morse almost one hundred years earlier.
59
  Bremen revolutionized 
private procedural ordering by doing two things.  First, it boldly and decisively discarded 
the ouster doctrine, relegating it to mere anachronism: “[the ouster doctrine] is hardly 
more than a vestigial legal fiction.”60  Perhaps more significantly, it shifted focus to party 
autonomy, making the touchstone for enforcement of forum selection clauses the quality 
of the bargaining process.
61
   
Following Bremen, the Court broke down one of the few remaining barriers 
standing in the way of contract procedure by abandoning any effort to distinguish 
between commercial and consumer contracts in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute.
62
  There, 
                                                 
56
 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 125 (2001); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 
1, 13-14 (1984) (“[T]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of the English courts for their own 
jurisdiction . . . This jealousy survived for so long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in 
the English common law and was adopted with it by the American courts.”) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 68-96 
(1924)). The statute’s purpose was to ensure that “written provisions or agreements for arbitration of 
disputes arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or 
with foreign nations” would be “valid and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. §1 (2006). For excellent accounts of the 
FAA’s legislative history, see James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745 (2009); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial 
Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 1348 (2009) 
(providing a brief history of the passage of the FAA). 
57
 Dodge, supra note 12, at 735 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378–79 (1971); Nat’l 
Equip. Rental v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16 (1964); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 
421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187–88 (1972)). 
58
 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). 
59
 See, e.g., David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence 
of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 
1095 (2002) (describing the case as “a sea-change in the way private agreement is viewed in relation to 
procedure”); William J. Woodward, Jr., Finding the Contract in Contracts for Law, Forum and Arbitration, 
2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1, 15 (2006) (observing that the law “changed dramatically” in The Bremen); Linda 
S. Mullenix, supra note 28, at 307 (“The current doctrine of consensual adjudicatory procedure . . . is based 
on Supreme Court pronouncements in The Bremen.”). 
60
 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. 
61
 See id. at 15 (finding that forum selection clauses should be enforced unless the resisting party can 
“clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid”); see 
also, e.g., Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts To Remake the Rules of 
Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579, 597 (2007) (describing the Court as 
elevating the concept of freedom of contract, thereby allowing parties to bargain about how a dispute will 
be decided); Linda S. Mullenix et al., Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 543 
(1995) (arguing that the Court in The Bremen adopted a “strongly stated federal policy favoring 
enforceability, subject to usual contract principles”); KEVIN M. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND VENUE 85 n.60 (1999) (stating that The Bremen “shift[ed] from a 
jurisdictional to a contractual paradigm”).  
62
 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587–88 (1991). 
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extending its pro-autonomy decision in Bremen, the Court brushed past a common law 
rule that forum-selection clauses in “form contracts” were presumptively unenforceable 
and reasoned that such clauses should, instead, be enforced because consumers “benefit 
in the form of reduced [prices] reflecting the savings that the [firm] enjoys by limiting the 
fora in which it may be sued.”63 
Since Bremen and Shute, party autonomy regarding pre-dispute procedural 
determinations flourishes in an increasingly wider range of commercial and non-
commercial settings.
64
  To the extent that parties want to customize procedural rules, 
“almost limitless” methods of modification are available to them.65  For instance, in 
addition to entering into arbitration agreements, of course, parties can (and regularly do) 
include forum selection clauses,
66
 choice of law clauses,
67
 clauses dealing with 
appointment of service agents or waiver of notice,
68
 and limitation period clauses
69
 in 
their contracts.  Parties can even waive the right to notice and a hearing by using 
cognovits notes.
70
  Additionally, parties commonly waive the right to a trial by jury,
71
 
                                                 
63
 Id. at 594 (“[I]t stands to reason that passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause like 
that at issue in this case benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys 
by limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”). 
64
 Mullenix, supra note 28, at 302-03. 
65
 Moffitt, supra note 25, at 465. 
66
 See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake in 
Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 118 (2009) (observing that parties “commonly” contract over 
choice of forum “in merger agreements and other highly negotiated corporate and commercial contracts”); 
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Ex Ante Choices of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of 
Corporate Merger Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1987 tbl.2 (2006) (finding that about 53-percent of 
a sample of mergers clauses included forum selection provisions). 
67
 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. 
REV. 363, 403 (2003) (discussing why most such clauses are enforced by courts). 
68
 Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (“[I]t is settled . . . that parties to 
a contract may agree in advance . . . to waive notice altogether.”). 
69
 See, e.g., 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:12, at 264-67 (4th ed. 1997) 
(discussing the enforceability of such clauses); Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The 
Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008) (discussing the frequency of 
use of such clauses in consumer contracts). 
70
 See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972); D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 
(1972). The enforcement of contractual confession of judgments does not violate the defendant's right to 
due process provided that there is clear and convincing evidence that the waiver of notice and hearing was 
voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made. Id. at 185-87. 
71
 Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1595 
(2005) (“Most courts will enforce contractual jury waivers.”); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
Do Juries Add Value? Evidence from an Empirical Study of Jury Trial Waiver Clauses in Large Corporate 
Contracts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 539, 539 (2007) (finding that about 20-percent of a sample of 
merger and acquisition agreements contained a jury trial waiver provision).  Significantly, even though the 
Court has said that the standard for evaluating jury trial waivers is constitutional rather than contractual, see 
D.H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 185, lower courts seem to focus on the propriety of the bargaining process to 
the exclusion of any other concerns, see, e.g., IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 
512 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court’s refusal to enforce a jury waiver embedded 
in a sales contract on the view that “[a]s long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop 
elsewhere, consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention”). 
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they modify the rules of discovery,
72
 enter into provisions modifying burdens of proof,
73
 
and waive class action rights.
74
  Even procedural requirements that might seem 
“immutable,” such as jurisdictional requirements, have, in recent years been subject to 
some contractual modification.
75
   
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed the use of all of these – 
and the many other potential – forms of private procedural ordering, with almost no 
exceptions other than Hall Street, the Court’s precedent “treats procedural contracts as a 
method for generating procedural efficiencies and increased certainty of process, 
resulting in broad enforcement of procedural terms.”76  The trend of precedent, in short, 
seems unequivocally to favor party autonomy and private procedural ordering. 
C. The Case for Party Control: Efficiency Gains From Customized Procedure 
The doctrinal reality, as the previous section shows, is that public procedure is 
primarily comprised of default rather than mandatory rules. Even though most courts do 
not bother to articulate them, there are sound normative reasons rooted primarily in 
efficiency, to accept this reality.  The potential benefits from private procedural 
ordering
77
 are really just extensions of the benefits conferred by existing public 
procedural rules.  In adversarial systems of adjudication, public procedural rules are 
designed to strike a balance between the interests of the plaintiff and the defendant in 
order to provide efficiency and fairness in the resolution of disputes.
78
  Indeed, the 
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 See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 61, at 607 (“It is generally acknowledged that ex ante contracts to alter 
the rules of evidence are enforceable.”); Taylor & Cliffe, supra note 59, at 1086 (discussing pre-litigation 
agreements, in which parties to a contract “designate what evidence may or may not be presented as 
proof”). 
73
 See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 
YALE L. J. 814, 857-58 (2006) (noting that it is likely that courts would enforce reasonable allocations of 
burdens of proof and that good empirical evidence exists that parties contract for such allocations). 
74
 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: 
An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Non- consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 871, 884–86 (2008) (finding that eighty percent of consumer contracts with arbitration provisions 
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75
 Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 12, at 514 (noting that recent cases arguably allow for parties to 
enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts and contract around some constitutional standing 
barriers).  
76
 Jamie Dodge, supra note 12, at 739.  In fact, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Shute, the Court 
has not found that “a procedural contract violates fundamental fairness.”  Id. at 735-36. 
77
 Contracting parties, I assume, are rational in the sense that they only enter into contracts that they 
believe will make them better off. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Law and Economics of Incomplete 
Contracts, 2 ANNU. REV. L. & SOC. 279, 281 (2006) (assuming that contracting parties “act rationally, 
within the constraints of their environment, in the sense that they wish to contract if they believe the 
arrangement will make them better off and not otherwise”); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default 
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 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21[1][a] (3d ed. 2008) (“The 
application of orderly rules of procedure does not require the sacrifice of fundamental justice, but rather the 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and similar state rules of procedure, were crafted to 
meet both needs.
79
   
To that end, public procedural rules provide uniformity and so-called 
transsubstantivity – the rules are applied and interpreted in the same manner in all cases, 
irrespective of the subject matter in dispute.
80
  Uniformity and transsubstantivity aim to 
standardize procedure and achieve, in the aggregate, that compromise between efficiency 
and fairness in the widest swathe of cases possible.   
Like all pre-fabricated solutions, however, the rules cannot account for the 
individual nuances of every actual case.  In fact, the rules themselves suggest as much, 
recognizing that their one-size-fits-all template may not be optimal in all situations.  
Procedural rules, at least in the United States, leave litigants with broad discretion to 
conduct their affairs throughout the litigation process.
81
  Litigants have the responsibility 
and freedom, for instance, to discover, gather, and present facts to an essentially passive 
court.
82
  In so doing, parties can and do make a variety of strategic choices. There is a 
simple justification for the almost self-evidently obvious fact that parties exercise control 
over many of their litigation decisions: the twin goals of efficiency and justice can be best 
realized by giving them control over the development of their case.
83
  Of course, parties 
enjoy tremendous flexibility in tailoring discovery processes to meet their needs, 
including deciding how much to invest in evidence production.
84
  But parties can control 
                                                 
Rules must be construed to promote justice for both parties, not to defeat it. This mandate is met if 
substantial justice is accomplished between the parties.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[The Rules] should be 
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by particular substantive concerns”). 
81
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own litigation choices.”); see also STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 138 (7th ed. 2008) (“One of the 
hallmarks of the U.S. law is the extent to which the rules of procedure are ‘default’ rules, rules that govern 
if the parties have not agreed to something else.”). 
82
 See, e.g., Scott & Triantis, supra note 73, at 826 (“In the adversarial litigation system, the court 
chooses between the self-interested evidence presented by the parties.”). 
83
 See, e.g., Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L. J. 
301, 316-19 (1989) (discussing the two justifications for the adversarial system: truth-finding and 
preservation of individual dignity). 
84
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 29 (providing that “[u]nless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate” 
that certain aspects of depositions will be conducted in particular ways and that “other procedures 
governing or limiting discovery be modified”); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Duty to Disclose; General 
Provisions Governing Discovery, in 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26.04[1], at 26-
 
89 
 
the post-dispute contours of procedure in a variety of other ways as well.
85
  For example, 
litigants may enter stipulations,
86
 consent to waiver of service of process,
87
 amend 
pleadings,
88
 waive the right to a jury trial,
89
 substitute a magistrate judge for an Article III 
district judge,
90
 or even waive their right to appeal.
91
  By making such post-dispute 
procedural choices, litigants can calibrate their litigation expenditures to their individual 
tolerances for accuracy and risk and thus maximize efficiency as well as fairness. 
But as the last section demonstrated, party control of litigation is not limited to 
post-dispute modifications.  Rather, parties regularly enter into, and courts seem very 
willing to enforce, ex ante procedural contracts.
92
  The justification for such ex ante 
procedural ordering rests on the same underlying premise that parties are in the best 
position to maximize the “incentive bang for the enforcement buck.”93 Ex ante procedural 
contracting simply extends the logic and the range of potential efficiency gains from 
customizable procedure. 
To see how, it is worth recapping the path-breaking article Anticipating Litigation 
in Contract Design in which Professors Scott and Triantis suggest that contracting parties 
can structure procedural rules in ways that will increase their joint surplus.
94
 According to 
Professors Scott and Triantis, parties vary the precision of contract provisions in order to 
shift costs between the time of contracting and the time of dispute in order to enhance 
their overall welfare.
95
  When parties choose a relatively precise or specific rule, they are 
increasing their ex ante investment.
96
  In other words, parties spend more money at the 
front end of the contracting process contemplating future contingencies and negotiating 
                                                 
35 (3d ed. 2008) (“Parties may mutually stipulate to use procedures for discovery that vary from the 
rules....”); 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE §§ 2091-2092 (3d ed. 2012) (delineating the parameters of the ability of litigants to 
stipulate discovery procedure). 
85
 For a thorough discussion of post-dispute procedural stipulations, see generally Michael L. Moffitt, 
Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 
(2007). 
86
 See, e.g., 73 AM. JUR. 2d Stipulations §15. 
87
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) (allowing parties to waive service of process in order to save money and 
effort); 4A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §1092.1 (3d. 
ed. 2012) (discussing the process for procuring waiver). 
88
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 15 (both before and during trial). 
89
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(1). 
90
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 73. 
91
 See e.g., Acton v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, Inc., 163 F.3d 605 (9th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table 
decision) (dismissing appeal base don a post-dispute agreement); see also 15A CHARLES ALLEN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND 
RELATED MATTERS §3901 (noting that “the most likely occasion for waiver arises from a settlement 
agreement that calls for resolution of some disputed matter by the district court, coupled with an explicit 
agreement that the district court decision shall be final and that all rights of appeal are waived”). 
92
 See supra at Part II(B). 
93
 Robert E. Scott & George E. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L. J. 
814, 856 (2006). 
94
 Id. at 856-60. 
95
 See Allen Blair, Hard Cases Under the Convention on the International Sale of Goods: A Proposed 
Taxonomy of Interpretive Challenges, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 269, 301-02 (2011). 
96
 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1071 (2009). 
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over terms specifying precise obligations in light of those contingencies.  By investing 
more at the front end of the process, parties are hoping to leverage the information that 
they have about their shared contracting goals and incentives to maximize gains from 
trade in order to reduce ex post enforcement costs.
97
  On the other hand, when parties 
choose a relatively open-textured standard, they are decreasing their ex ante investment 
and increasing their expected ex post enforcement costs.
98
  Rather than spending time and 
money worrying about future contingencies and terms specifying precise obligations in 
light of those contingencies at the front end of the contracting process, parties are 
choosing to delegate to a future tribunal the task of specifying precise obligations.  Such 
ex post or back-end specification is efficient, Professors Scott and Triantis argue, where 
the value to the parties of a decision maker’s hindsight outweighs the value that the 
parties would gain by specifying ex ante a more precise rule to govern their contract.
99
  In 
short:  
 
By reaching the optimal combination of front-end and back-end costs, 
parties can minimize the aggregate contracting costs of achieving a 
particular gain in contractual incentives. Conversely, for any given 
expenditure of contracting costs, the parties can reach the highest possible 
incentive gains by optimizing the allocation of their investment between 
the front and back ends.
100
 
 
This insight reveals the potential of procedural contracting.
101
  In fact, Professors 
Scott and Triantis point out that parties often choose to opt out of the public adjudicatory 
system entirely in favor of arbitration because “the parties’ ex ante agreement as to 
procedure improves the cost-effectiveness of their prospective enforcement 
mechanism.”102  They proceed to identify other possible procedural contracting 
mechanisms and apply their insights to one example, ex ante modifications of burdens of 
proof.
103
   
                                                 
97
 Id. at 1071 (noting that parties “are exploiting their informational advantage (they know their 
contractual ends and have the right incentives to choose the best means to achieve them), but they are 
sacrificing the hindsight advantage that a court might have”). 
98
 See id. 
99
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 73 at 819, 842 (“The parties choose between front- and back-end proxy 
determination by comparing the informational advantage the parties may have at the time of contracting 
against the hindsight advantage of determining proxies in later litigation”) (“The parties may view the 
court’s hindsight as an advantage or disadvantage depending on how much uncertainty has been resolved 
by the time contract performance is due”).   
100
 Id. at 817. 
101
 See also, e.g., Albert Choi and George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly 
Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008) (demonstrating that increasing litigation costs may induce 
better incentives to perform contractual obligations); Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (1997) (discussing the advantages of contracting over preferred Bankruptcy 
procedures). 
102
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 73, at 856, n. 123 (citing Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, 
The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 
549, 558 (2003) (Part of the reason that arbitration might be desirable is because it permits vague 
contractual terms to be interpreted and enforced by industry experts rather than generalist judges). 
103
 Scott & Triantis, supra note 73, at 857-71. 
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With respect to burdens of proof, as Professors Scott and Triantis argue, even if 
the default allocation can be rationalized,
104
 “it is highly unlikely that it yields the 
efficient . . . allocation for every contract.”105  They also show how these different 
customized allocations might benefit parties.
106
  The same, certainly, can be said of most 
procedural rules.  Even to the extent that existing public procedural rules can be 
rationalized,
107
 it is unlikely that they optimally balance efficiency and accuracy in all 
cases.  Fine-tuning procedure can benefit parties in at least two significant ways: by 
curbing post-dispute opportunism and by reinforcing substantive obligations and 
optimizing pre-dispute behavior. 
1. Curbing Post-Dispute Opportunism 
Private procedural ordering can help maximize the joint surplus from contracting 
by reducing the expected costs of future disputes.  Customized procedural rules might 
achieve this gain by limiting or eliminating certain kinds of costly post-dispute behavior, 
such as escalating the costs of discovery or engaging in abusive motion practice.
108
    
Pre-dispute private procedural ordering, in fact, is far more effective than post-
dispute ordering in this regard for at least three reasons.  First, before a dispute, parties 
cannot accurately predict what side of what issues they will each take.  This uncertainly 
affords the parties a degree of objectivity that they lack by the time that a dispute 
foments, allowing them to make less emotionally charged choices about procedures and 
processes that will maximize their joint welfare.
109
  Second, pre-dispute, and particularly 
                                                 
104
 They argue that they are “hard pressed,” along with most other commentators, to rationalize the 
default allocation.  Id. at 866. 
105
 Id.  
106
 See id. at 867-78. 
107
 I presume that most such rules are soundly underpinned by a desire to replicate what parties would 
have chosen for themselves if they had thought about them – they are, in other words, so-called 
“majoritarian” defaults – or they exist in order to protect vulnerable parties or non-parties.  See, e.g., Ian 
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541, 596 
(2003) (“The justification for a default rule is that it does for parties what they would have done for 
themselves had their contracting costs been lower.”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (explaining 
penalty defaults). 
108
 See generally, e.g., David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for 
Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).  Parties face a collective-action problem during 
discovery.  In a highly simplified model, each party could choose to be abusive or reasonable with its 
discovery requests.  Jointly, the parties would be best served by both employing reasonable discovery 
requests.  Individually, however, each party would do better if it employed abusive discovery techniques 
while the other was reasonable.  Because both parties know this, they face a Prisoner’s Dilemma, which 
results in an equilibrium where both parties are worse off than if they had been reasonable.  The same basic 
model applies to abusive motion practice. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through 
Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-15 (1994); 
John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and 
Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 584-86 (1989). 
109
 See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice--Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1828-31 
(1997) (describing the difference between ex ante and ex post perspectives when information differs); 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 743 (2001) (noting that 
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at the outset of contracting, transfer payments are much more feasible.  Accordingly, 
even asymmetric procedural advantages can be considered so long as the benefited party 
can purchase such advantages from the other at an agreed upon price.
110
  Finally, before a 
dispute arises, and again especially during contract negotiations, parties enjoy the 
cooperative benefits of a deal-making ethos. Thus, they are less likely to succumb to 
various cognitive biases that might impede negotiating mutually beneficial procedural 
terms.
111
  
By delimiting through contract the range of strategic procedural choices available 
before a dispute arises, the parties can enhance the overall value of their agreements.  
This sort of customization offers nearly limitless scope and potential for value-
maximization. 
2. Reinforcing Substantive Obligations and Optimizing Pre-Dispute 
Behavior 
Pre-dispute procedural contracting also provides parties with additional means of 
reinforcing or defining their substantive obligations to and behavior towards one 
another.
112
  Parties already regularly negotiate over substantive terms that might be 
difficult to verify in subsequent litigation.
113
  For instance, parties often include terms 
                                                 
“because no dispute has yet arisen, the parties can consider the range of possible disputes that might arise in 
agreeing on a dispute resolution forum”).  But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem 
with Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 526-29 (2003) (criticizing some 
of the assumptions about information access that underlie typical ex ante arguments). 
110
 See Drahozal, supra note 109, at 746 (“[P]redispute arbitration agreements provide greater 
opportunities for making transfer payments than do postdispute arbitration agreements.”). 
111
 See generally, e.g., Russel Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and 
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281 (2006) (discussing a range of cognitive biases that can 
prevent successful post-dispute negotiations). 
112
 The divergence between ex ante and ex post optimal litigation decisions has been extensively 
analyzed in the law and economics literature.  See generally, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Fundamental 
Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 
(1997); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 392-401 (2004).  Suffice it to 
say here that procedural rules impact how parties evaluate their post-dispute payoffs and thus impact when 
(or if) parties assert their claims and how they make strategic choices during litigation. 
113
 Information may be said to be unobservable if the other contracting party cannot perceive it. 
Information may be observable but not verifiable if the other party can perceive it but cannot, at a 
reasonable case, prove that information to a court or other third party. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory 
of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1642 n.2 (2003); see also Lisa 
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business 
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1791-95 (1996) (discussing the distinction between observable 
information, which is information that it is both possible and worthwhile for transactors to obtain, and 
verifiable information, which is information that it is worthwhile for transactors to prove to a designated 
third-party neutral in the event of a dispute).  Parties often include in their contracts terms that might be 
cheap to observe but costly to verify.  See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Completing Contracts in the 
Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2008); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic 
Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010); see also, 
e.g., Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 150, 150–63 
(1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–
15 (1994). 
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that are conditioned on vague or difficult to prove states like “best efforts.”  The high 
costs of proving (or disproving) these states in court can function as a disincentive for 
parties to bring a claim and, at the very least, negatively impact the expected value of any 
claim.  Parties might conversely contract for very precise obligations that are easily 
verifiable in court.  Such terms can function to dissuade opportunistic shirking or holdups 
during performance of the contract.  Alternatively, they can deter parties from filing 
nuisance claims or claims that have only marginal factual support.  Such gains can be 
realized by reducing the likelihood of future litigation altogether or by narrowing the 
range of disputes in any future litigation.   
But procedural contracting offers parties even more options for calibrating their 
substantive obligations to one another and optimizing behavior prior to a dispute arising.  
Aware of the rules that will govern any future disputes at the time of contracting, and 
knowing that these rules will affect their litigation behavior and the outcome of litigation, 
parties can tailor their respective pre-dispute actions.
114
  For instance, agreeing that expert 
testimony will be given by a third-party-appointed neutral rather than through party 
appointed advocates might incentivize greater compliance with performance standards 
pre-dispute.
115
 Or, opting into expanded review of arbitral awards could be seen as a 
means of increasing accuracy (and costs) and thus deterring more questionable claims.
116
 
These simple examples do not exhaust the numerous possibilities.
117
  The 
fundamental point, however, is that parties can use customized procedural devices in 
combination with carefully tailored substantive obligations to reduce opportunities for ex 
post opportunism and to incentivize pre-dispute behaviors that increase their joint 
surplus.  In addition to benefiting the parties directly, customized procedure might also 
reduce the public costs associated with the court system, at least to the degree that private 
and public costs are correlated.
118
  Finally, there are potential spillover benefits to the 
public adjudication system, at least with some forms of procedural contracting, such as 
expanded judicial review of arbitral awards.
119
 
                                                 
114
 Procedural contracting can help overcome the “acoustic separation” between the ex ante 
understanding that parties have about how their future disputes will be adjudicated and their ex post 
understanding.  See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984); see also, generally, Bruce Hay, Procedural Justice: Ex Ante 
Vs. Ex Post , 44 UCLA L. REV. 1803 (1997). 
115
 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through Party Choice, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1356 (2012) (offering a similar example). 
116
 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 
(1995). 
117
 See generally, e.g., Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contracting Around Twombly, 60 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1 (2010) (discussing possible advantages of modifying the Twombly pleading standard by contract). 
118
 See, e.g., Bone, supra note 115, at 1356; Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 
606 (Cal. 2008) (discussing among the advantages of allowing parties to contract for expanded judicial 
review of arbitral awards the reduced burdens on the court system). 
119
 See Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 606 (“This procedure better advances the state of the law and 
facilitates the necessary beneficial input from experts in the field.”) (quoting Dan C. Hulea, Contracting to 
Expand the Scope of Review of Foreign Arbitral Awards: An American Perspective, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 
313, 355 (2003)).  
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D. The Line between Mockery and Efficiency: Limits to Customized Procedure  
Set against the potential benefits of private procedural ordering are very real 
concerns, of course, about the implications of subverting public process to personal 
autonomy.  Espousing one aspect of this concern in his customary charismatic style, 
Judge Kozinski said that he would have qualms about enforcing a procedural contract 
opting into expanded judicial review of arbitral awards “if the agreement provided that 
the district judge would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a 
dead fowl.”120  Provocative as such reductio ad absurdum thought experiments can be, 
the hard work of actually finding the line between mockery and the potential efficiency 
gains discussed in the previous section, however, can be daunting.
 121
 
In a nutshell, most concerns over private procedural ordering fall into one of four 
categories, the first two of which focus on the immediate parties and the second two of 
which are societal: (1) doubts about consent in the context of consumer or weaker party 
transactions;
122
 (2) worries that procedural machinations will be used to gain covert 
substantive advantages, particularly in the context of consumer or weaker party 
transactions;
123
 (3) concerns that private procedural ordering will hinder the structural 
role of private enforcement in our governmental system;
124
 and (4) worries that private 
procedural ordering will impede dissemination of information that can be used to public 
benefit.
125
  
Though all four concerns pose legitimate challenges to private procedural 
ordering and warrant careful consideration, a full analysis of how they fare against the 
potential benefits discussed in the previous section is beyond the scope of this Article.  
                                                 
120
 Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
121
 See David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of 
Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 1090 
(2002) (“So where is the line between mockery and efficiency? Or, should there be any line at all? That is, 
should a public dispute resolution system be altered by private agreement?”). 
122
 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642–43 (1996) (“[I]t is critical to distinguish 
between commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining power, 
and commercial arbitration forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees, employees or others through 
the use of form contracts.”); Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of 
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 
819, 822 (2003)  (arbitration “has the capacity to reduce, if not altogether eliminate access to the courts and 
to the law.”). 
123
 See Dodge, supra note 12 at 734 (expressing the concern that parties might use procedural contracts 
to inappropriately modify substantive rights and incentives to exercise those rights). 
124
 See e.g., Nebraska v. Nebraska Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577, 581-83 (Neb. 1991) (basing 
refusal to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements on Nebraska cases decided in the 1800s, and relying 
on pre-FAA cases in warning that arbitration will “open a leak in the dyke of constitutional guarantees 
which might some day carry all away”) (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902)); J. 
Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1137, 1167-70 (2012) (noting how procedural contracting can negatively impact the role of private 
enforcement by changing “stakes of litigation and therefore discourage suit in the first place”). 
125
  1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 7a, at 605 (Peter Tillers ed. 
1983) (“It is arguable that the proceedings in courts are not there solely for the convenience of the parties 
and that it is important for social reasons to maintain the solemnity and dignity of judicial proceedings 
regardless of the wishes of the parties.”). 
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Whatever the merits of these challenges, as the next section explains, Hall Street was not 
relying on them.  Nothing in the Court’s analysis suggests that it was troubled in the 
slightest by the principles of autonomy underlying private procedural ordering.  
E. A Rolling Stop: Understanding Hall Street in Light of the Trend Favoring 
Private Procedural Ordering 
The trend of precedent is clear: courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, 
strongly favor private procedural ordering.  Although there was initial reluctance to the 
notion of party control over procedure and processes, that reluctance ultimately gave way 
to more modern notions of party autonomy and contract.  Since Bremen, the Court has, 
with really only one notable exception, continued to advance party autonomy as the new 
touchstone of process and procedure.
126
 
The notable exception, of course, is Hall Street.  With little hesitation, the Hall 
Street Court narrowly construed the FAA to limit party freedom and autonomy.  Given 
that one could fairly view arbitration as the apotheosis of private procedural ordering – as 
it allows parties the freedom to opt out of the public set of procedural rules and 
protections altogether – a closer consideration of the case in the context of private 
procedural ordering is warranted. 
  On one level, Hall Street surprisingly countered Supreme Court arbitration 
precedent, which had been at the avant-garde of private procedural ordering.
127
  The case 
elevated an advantage – finality – to the status of an “essential virtue” while dislodging 
the cornerstone of the arbitral process – freedom of contract.128  Up until Hall Street, the 
mantra that “arbitration is a creature of contract,”129 reflected the decisional history of the 
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 See supra at Part II(B). 
127
 See Rachel S. Portnoy, Comment, Embracing the Alternative: Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, 
Inc. Puts the Alternative Back into Alternative Dispute Resolution, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 991, 998 (2010) 
(“The Hall Street ruling came as a surprise to many.”). 
128
 See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008) (stating that the ruling was 
“substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain 
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”) (emphasis added). 
129
 Courts and commentators have recognized the fundamental contractual nature of arbitration, often 
employing this phrase.  See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 570-71 
(1960) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To be sure, since arbitration is a creature of contract, a court must 
always inquire, when a party seeks to invoke its aid to force a reluctant party to the arbitration table, 
whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute.”); Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 
F.3d 172, 194 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As we have stressed, ‘[a]rbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, 
and an arbitrator’s authority is derived from an agreement to arbitrate.”’ (quoting Allstate Settlement Corp. 
v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 559 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 2009))); Edstrom Indus., Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. 
Co., 516 F.3d 546, 552 (7th Cir. 2008) (“But precisely because arbitration is a creature of contract, the 
arbitrator cannot disregard the lawful directions the parties have given them. If they tell him to apply 
Wisconsin law, he cannot apply New York law.”), abrogated by Affymax, Inc. v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen 
Pharms., Inc., 660 F.3d 281 (7th Cir. 2011); MyLinda K. Sims & Richard A. Bales, Much Ado About 
Nothing: The Future of Manifest Disregard After Hall Street, 62 S.C. L. REV. 407, 410 (2010) ( “[Section 
2] also establishes that arbitration is a creature of contract law and that arbitrational provisions should be 
viewed in this light.”); Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. Milligan, What You Always Wanted to Know About 
Arbitration: Five Arbitration Issues Recently Decided by the Courts, 73 TEX. B. J. 634, 634 (2010) 
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Court, which, consistent with other procedural contracting cases, had recognized the 
primacy of party autonomy.
130
   
Though the speed and finality of arbitration can frequently be an important – 
perhaps even decisive – advantage for parties, arbitration offers a number of other 
advantages as well.
131
  Prizing one advantage as “essential” while undercutting the 
premise at the core of procedural contracting, that parties are in the best position to gauge 
what combination of processes and procedures will best maximize their joint surplus, was 
shortsighted.  Just because parties might reasonably be willing to trade off some speed 
and finality in exchange for opportunities to correct legal (or factual) errors through 
expanded judicial review, they are not necessarily opting out of the other advantages that 
arbitration can offer.  For instance, parties might well believe that arbitration can be a 
superior way to manage the presentation of complex and industry-specific facts through a 
process that allows for the selection of decision makers with expertise and mature 
judgment in the subject area.  Especially in large transactions, however, in which 
enormous sums may be tied up for many years, legal accuracy might be of paramount 
concern to contracting parties. 
Read expansively, then, Hall Street’s refusal to allow parties the freedom to make 
these sorts of trade-off choices – the same sorts of trade-off choices that parties make 
with respect to other forms of procedural contracting – could signal the Court’s interest in 
halting the advance of private procedural ordering.  I argue, however, that this reading 
does not make sense for at least two reasons. 
First, the Hall Street Court makes virtually no reference to policy rationales at all, 
and it most certainly does not implicate, in any sense, any of the four categories of 
concerns over procedural contracting referenced in the previous section.  The Court 
makes no mention of disparities in party bargaining power – indeed, it would have been 
hard pressed to do so given that the parties in Hall Street were both sophisticated 
businesses.  Similarly, the Court does not even hint that expanded judicial review would 
somehow sneak substantive advantages in through the procedural back door.  And, 
                                                 
(“Because arbitration is a creature of contract, the rights and obligations of the parties and the arbitrators 
are, to an important extent, borne out of the arbitration clause itself.”). 
130
 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (“[N]egotiation by experienced and 
sophisticated businessmen . . . absent some compelling and countervailing reason . . . should be honored by 
the parties and enforced by the courts.”) (quoting M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 
(1972)); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (“[T]he overriding goal of the 
Arbitration Act was [not] to promote the expeditious resolution of claims . . . but merely the enforcement . . 
. of privately negotiated arbitration agreements.”); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
947 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he basic objective [of the FAA is] not to resolve 
disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes . . . but to ensure that 
commercial arbitration agreements . . . are enforced according to their terms.”); see also, e.g., Margaret 
Moses, Can Parties Tell Courts What to Do? Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 52 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 429, 444 (2004) (“[The] position that the FAA permits expanded judicial review appears . . . 
consistent with both legislative intent and Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of 
enforcing arbitral agreements in accordance with their terms.”); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy 
and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2010) (“The Court's ruling was surprising 
to some, especially because the Court had previously held that party autonomy, not efficiency, was the 
touchstone of arbitration under the FAA.”). 
131
 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 11-13 (5th 
ed. 2009) (discussing some of these advantages). 
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perhaps more tellingly, the Court makes no reference to expanded judicial review 
somehow undermining the proper functioning of the public adjudicatory system.  
Significantly, the opportunity for the Court to suggest that contractually expanded review 
constituted an improper commandeering of the judicial process existed.  Judge Richard 
Posner, for instance, had argued, albeit in dicta, that parties could not contract for 
expanded judicial review of their arbitral awards because “federal jurisdiction cannot be 
created by contract.”132  Variants of this argument gained traction in the debates over 
expanded judicial review prior to the Court’s ruling in Hall Street.133  Nevertheless, the 
Court did not engage the argument at all. 
Second, and far more significantly, the Court left open “other avenues” by which 
parties could seek expanded judicial review of their awards.
135
  Although this portion of 
the case was merely dicta, and arguably included only because of the clumsy presentation 
of the case on appeal,
136
 the Court’s invitation for a greater state law role is capacious.  In 
holding that Section 10 provides the “exclusive regime[]” for review of awards under the 
FAA, the Court made clear that it did “not purport to say that [Section 10] exclude[s] 
more searching review based on authority outside the statute as well.”137  Such an 
invitation does not indicate that the Court was shying away from procedural contracting 
or party autonomy at all.  Instead, this language suggests only that the Court believed that 
this autonomy should be fostered and developed under state rather than federal law.  As 
the next section goes on to discuss, the evidence indicates that, for better or worse, states 
are beginning to embrace the freedom that Hall Street offers to them. 
III. THE STATUS OF STATE LAWS GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL 
AWARDS 
Pay attention to where you are going because without meaning you might 
get nowhere.
138
 
 
As the last Part concluded, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street “left the door 
ajar for alternate routes to an expanded scope of review.”139  Although Hall Street did so 
only in dicta, the Court’s invitation for a greater state law role in the enforcement and 
review of arbitral awards has to be taken seriously in order to square Hall Street’s 
holding with the broader trend of precedent favoring private procedural ordering.  
                                                 
132
 Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1505 (7th Cir. 1991). 
133
 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 225, 227-
30 (1997) (describing the extent to which this argument had been wielded in the debate to date and 
famously calling it “the very reddest of red herrings”). 
135
 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 590 (2008) 
136
 The parties never raised the application of the FAA to the agreement as an issue until the case was 
presented to the Supreme Court.  Moreover, save for a fairly spare reference at the Court of Appeals, the 
parties had not addressed the possibility review should be governed not by the FAA but instead by the 
district court’s Rule 16 case management powers.  See id. 
137
 Id. 
138
 A. A. Milne, Winnie-The-Pooh: Unbouncing of Tigger 5 (1928). 
139
 Cable Connection, Inc. v. DirectTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 596 (Cal. 2008). 
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Accordingly, this Part briefly surveys the current status of state laws governing 
judicial review.  It observes that, although most states’ arbitration laws closely parallel 
the FAA and many courts thus expressly follow Hall Street or decline to allow 
contractually expanded judicial review for reasons similar to those offered in Hall Street, 
there are signs that states are starting to experiment with more intrusive and different 
standards for judicial review of arbitral awards.  Five states have parted ways with Hall 
Street and allow for parties to contract into expanded judicial review.  A handful of 
additional states have laws allowing courts to review arbitral awards for at least some 
errors of law or facts or both. 
A. The Status Quo: States Following Federal Law and Hall Street 
The history of the development of state laws governing arbitration follows a 
somewhat convoluted path.
140
  After a failed attempt by the National Conference of 
Commissioners on State Laws (“NCCUSL”) to forward a workable Uniform Arbitration 
Act (“UAA”) in 1926, the uniform drafters took another stab in 1956.141  For the 
purposes of this Article, the key point is that the 1956 UAA and the 2000 UAA track the 
provisions of the FAA, particularly with respect to judicial enforcement and review, very 
closely.
142
  At present, 39 states have enacted either the 1956 or the 2000 UAA, and three 
                                                 
140
 See Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 520 (2009) (discussing this development 
and observing that “[t]he adoption of state statutory standards for judicial review of arbitration awards 
[was] more complex” than the adoption of the FAA). 
141
 See id.; REV. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12 (1956) (In 2000, the UAA was revised, though the relevant 
language regarding judicial enforcement and review remained virtually unchanged.).   
142
 See Huber, supra note 140 at 520.  Section 10 of the FAA, dealing with vacatur of awards, provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
(a) [T]he United States court . . . may make an order vacating the [arbitration] award 
upon the application of any party to the arbitration -- 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and 
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party 
have been prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that 
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. 9 
U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).   
In comparison, the Section 12 of the 1956 UAA provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where: 
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; 
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption 
in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; 
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being 
shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so 
 
99 
 
more states have introduced the 2000 UAA in 2013.
143
  Of the remaining states, only 
three have arbitration laws that are not either patterned after the UAA or the FAA: 
Alabama, New Hampshire, and West Virginia.
144
 
Many of these states either expressly follow Hall Street or rely on similar 
reasoning to prevent parties from contracting for expanded judicial review.
145
  Others 
have held that the statutory grounds for vacatur are exclusive without specifically holding 
that the grounds may not be expanded by contract.
146
  In short, most states construe their 
arbitration laws in much the same manner as the FAA.
147
  As the next two sections 
                                                 
conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of Section 5, as to prejudice 
substantially the rights of a party; or 
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined 
in proceedings under Section 2 and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing 
without raising the objection; but the fact that the relief was such that it could not or 
would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing to 
confirm the award.   
 
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12 (1956); see also REV. UNIF. ARB. ACT § 23 (2000) (adopting substantially similar 
grounds for vacatur). 
143
 See UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20%282000%29 (last visited Apr. 10, 
2013). 
144
 See ALA. CODE § 6-6-14 (2013) (providing that an award “cannot be inquired into or impeached for 
want of form or for irregularity . . . unless the arbitrators are guilty of fraud, partiality, or corruption in 
making it”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 542:8 (2013) (allowing vacatur for “fraud, corruption, or misconduct 
by the parties or by the arbitrators, or on the ground that the arbitrators have exceeded their powers,” but 
also allowing review for “plain mistake”); W.VA. CODE § 55-10-4 (2012) (dictating that award may not be 
set aside “except for errors apparent on its face, unless it appears to have been procured by corruption or 
other undue means, or by mistake, or that there was partiality or misbehavior in the arbitrators, or any of 
them, or that the arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award 
upon the subject matter submitted was not made”). 
145
 See, e.g., HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725, 735 (Me. 2011) (following Hall Street); 
Brookfield Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663, 666 (Ga. 2010) (same); 
Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252,  259–60, 261 (Tenn. 2010) (same); 
John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 704 (N.D. 2003) (holding that “parties 
to an arbitration agreement cannot contractually expand the scope of judicial review beyond that provided 
by [the Uniform Arbitration Act as adopted by North Dakota]”); Chicago SouthShore & S. Bend R.R. v. N. 
Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 682 N.E.2d 156, 159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 703 N.E.2d 
7 (Ill. 1998) (“The subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court to review an arbitration award is limited and 
circumscribed by statute. The parties may not, by agreement or otherwise, expand that limited 
jurisdiction.”); Brucker v. McKinlay Transp., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 536, 540 (Mich. 1997) (holding that an 
arbitration agreement that provides for judicial confirmation must conform to the statute because parties 
may not privately create a role for public institutions). 
146
 See, e.g., Sch. Comm. of Pittsfield v. United Educators of Pittsfield,  784 N.E.2d 11, 16 (Mass. 
2003) (stating that unless a statutorily enumerated ground for vacatur is established, courts are “strictly 
bound by the arbitrator's factual findings and conclusions of law, even if they are in error,” and that 
“[a]rbitration would have little value it if were merely an intermediate step between a grievance and 
litigation in the courts”); Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Fla. 1989) 
(stating that the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award are extremely limited by statute and do 
not include error of law). 
147
 See Stephen Willis Murphy, Note, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law, 96 VA. 
L. REV. 887, 891 (2010) (surveying state laws and finding a “majority rule” whereby at least 38 states 
restrictively read their arbitration laws effectively consistent with the FAA). 
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demonstrate, however, there is reason to believe that, in the wake of Hall Street, states 
are beginning to experiment with different and potentially more intrusive review 
standards. 
B. A Nod to Autonomy: States Allowing for Contractually Expanded Judicial 
Review of Arbitral Awards 
Currently, California, Connecticut, Alabama, Texas and New Jersey part ways 
with Hall Street.  These five states offer parties the freedom to contractually expand the 
grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards.  The following subsections briefly recap 
the law in these jurisdictions and the justifications they have given for separating 
themselves from Hall Street. 
1. California 
Shortly after Hall Street, California seized on the invitation for states to provide 
an alternative to the FAA’s exclusive grounds for vacatur.  In Cable Connection, Inc. v. 
DIRECTV, Inc., the California Supreme Court (California Court) concluded that parties 
were free, under California’s arbitration statute, to contract for expanded judicial review 
of arbitral awards.  In reaching this conclusion, the California Court rejected Hall Street’s 
reasoning and concluded that Hall Street’s invitation was consistent with its view that the 
FAA did not preempt state procedural laws in state court proceedings.  Both findings are 
worth a closer examination, as they provide a model for how other states might justify 
departures from the FAA. 
The California Court was presented with an arbitration agreement governed by 
state law.
148
  According to this agreement, the arbitrators did not have “the power to 
commit errors of law or legal reasoning, and the award [could] be vacated or corrected on 
appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction for any such error.”149  Plaintiffs argued, 
before the arbitrators, that they were entitled to class-wide arbitration under the 
agreement, and the arbitrators agreed.
150
  Defendant, DIRECTV, then filed a motion to 
vacate in state court on several grounds, including most significantly that the award was 
the product of errors of law and thus subject to judicial review.
151
 
The trial court agreed with DIRECTV and vacated the award, but the Court of 
Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court had exceeded its authority by engaging in a 
                                                 
148
 Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 44 Cal. 4th 1334, 1340-41 (Cal. 2008).  Interestingly, 
the agreement actually provided that “[t]he arbitrators shall apply California substantive law to the 
proceeding, except to the extent Federal substantive law would apply to any claim,” and it directed that the 
arbitration proceedings were to be governed by federal law and the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association.  Id. at 1340.  The Court, however, concluded, in a footnote, that “[b]ecause the parties 
proceeded in state court under the CAA, . . . judicial review of the award is governed by state law, though 
the arbitration proceedings are governed by federal procedural law and AAA rules under the terms of the 
contract.”  Id at 1341 n. 2. 
149
 Id. at 1341 n.3 
150
 See id. at 1342. 
151
 See id. 
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merits review of the arbitrator’s decision.152  In reaching its conclusion, the Court of 
Appeals relied on two previous cases that had determined that expanded judicial review 
provisions were unenforceable.
153
  Essentially, these cases advanced the contention that 
expanded review was impermissible because: (1) like the Court in Hall Street, they 
believed that expanded review “would undermine the benefits of arbitration and the goals 
of the Act to reduce expense and delay in resolving disputes”;154 and (2) they believed 
that judicial review would either be meaningless to or would improperly interfere with 
the arbitral process because arbitrators are not “ordinarily constrained to decide according 
to the rule of law.”155 
Confronted with these lower courts’ decisions and the U.S. Supreme Court’s then-
fresh ruling in Hall Street, the California Court first clarified that under state law parties 
can contractually agree to judicial review of an arbitration award.
156
  While admitting the 
similarities between the statutory schemes for enforcement of arbitral awards in the CAA 
and the FAA,
157
 the California Court cited its 1992 decision in Moncharsh v. Heily & 
Blasé to bolster the proposition that, in drafting the CAA, the legislature “adopt[ed] the 
position taken in case law . . . ‘that in the absence of some limiting clause in the 
arbitration agreement, the merits of the award, either on questions of fact or of law, may 
not be reviewed except as provided in the statute.”’158  According to the California Court, 
Moncharsh established a California rule “that the parties may obtain judicial review of 
the merits by express agreement” under the CAA.159  Because the language used by the 
parties in the pending case evidenced their unequivocal intent to exclude legal errors 
from the scope of the arbitrators’ powers, such errors fell within the scope of judicial 
review under California law.
160
 
The California Court then turned to the pressing question of whether Hall Street 
preempted this construction of the CAA.
161
  The California Court acknowledged U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent finding that “state laws invalidating arbitration agreements on 
grounds applicable only to arbitration provisions contravene the policy established by 
Section 2 of the FAA.”162  Nevertheless, it found that “the United States Supreme Court 
does not read the FAA’s procedural provisions to apply to state court proceedings.”163  
To reach this conclusion, it relied on its previous holding that “[t]he language used in 
[S]ections 3 and 4 and the legislative history of the FAA suggest that the sections were 
                                                 
152
 See id. at 1343. 
153
 See id. (citing Oakland–Alameda Cnty. Coliseum Auth. v. CC Partners, 101 Cal. App. 4th 635, 645 
(2002); Crowell v. Downey Cmty. Hosp. Found., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (2002)). 
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 Crowell, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 815. 
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 Id. at 814. 
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 See Cable Connection Inc., 44 Cal. 4th at 1340. 
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 See id. at 1344 (explaining that both “the CAA and the FAA provide only limited grounds for 
judicial review of an arbitration award,” and noting the similarities between the grounds for vacatur or 
modification in §§ 1286.2 (a) and 1286.6 of the CAA and those listed in §§ 10-11 of the FAA). 
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 Id. at 1356 (citing Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasé, 3 Cal. 4th 1, 23 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
159
 Id. at 1340. 
160
 See id. at 1350. 
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 See id. 
162
 Id. at 1351 (citing Cronus Invs., Inc. v. Concierge Servs., 35 Cal.4th 376, 389 (2005), among other 
cases). 
163
 Id.  
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intended to apply only in federal court proceedings.”164  Because the same language 
limiting applicability of those sections to a “United States district court” with jurisdiction 
under Title 28 of the United States Code exists in Sections 9 through 11, the California 
Court similarly characterized the FAA’s enforcement and review provisions as 
“procedural” and thus only applicable to the federal courts.165 
2. Alabama 
In a very brief 2010 ruling, the Alabama Supreme Court (Alabama Court) in 
Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Honea expressed solidarity with California and found 
that the FAA’s review provisions were “procedural” and thus not necessarily applicable 
in state court proceedings.
166
  In reaching this conclusion, the Alabama Court had to 
reevaluate its earlier position that “a party desiring judicial review of an arbitration award 
in a proceeding subject to the [FAA] is limited to arguments based on those grounds 
enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10.”167  Finding “good and sufficient reasons ‘to retreat from 
that position,’” the Alabama Court concluded that “[u]nder the Alabama common law, 
courts must rigorously enforce contracts, including arbitration agreements, according to 
their terms in order to give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the 
parties.”168 
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the decision, however, relates to the fact 
that the parties had expressly agreed that “any unsettled dispute or controversy will be 
resolved by arbitration in accordance with the FAA.”169  Moreover, unlike the situation 
facing the California Court in Cable Connections, there was “no evidence indicating that 
either [of the parties] ever contemplated review under the common law [of Alabama] as 
opposed to the FAA.”170  Accordingly, the Alabama Court’s determination that the FAA 
did not govern the review of the award is unusual, to put it mildly.  While claiming to be 
bound by parties’ intentions, the Alabama Court seemed to side step them, at least with 
respect to what law governed. 
3. Connecticut 
Although the matter is not free from doubt, it appears that courts in Connecticut 
also disagree with Hall Street.  In a decision released only two months after Hall Street, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court (Connecticut Court) said in a footnote that “[p]arties to 
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 Id. at 1352. 
166
 Raymond James Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Honea, 55 So.3d 1161, 1168-69 (Ala. 2010) (“§10 represents 
procedural as opposed to substantive law. We are accordingly at liberty to decide whether to apply §10 in 
state court proceedings on motions to vacate or to confirm an arbitration award.”) (citing to Cable 
Connection in a footnote). 
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 Horton Homes, Inc. v. Shaner, 999 So.2d 462, 467 n. 2 (Ala. 2008) (reiterating Birmingham News 
Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d 27, 46 (2004)). 
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 Hornea, 55 So.3d at 1169 (quoting Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So.2d at 46-47). 
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 Hornea, 55 So.3d at 1167. 
170
 Id. at 1168.  Although this was the argument of one of the parties, the Court never disagreed with it. 
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agreements remain, however, free to contract for expanded judicial review of an 
arbitrator’s findings.”171  This dicta seemed to reaffirm a position taken earlier by the 
Connecticut Court in its 2006 Stutz v. Shepard decision.
172
  In Stutz, the Connecticut 
Court unceremoniously upheld a contractual provision that invested a court with the 
power to review an arbitral award under a “clearly erroneous” standard.173  Although it 
provided virtually no analysis, the context suggests that the Connecticut Court simply 
viewed the provision as within the permissible scope of freedom of contract.
174
  In an 
unpublished case, the Connecticut Superior Court relied on these two decisions to 
conclude that a provision providing for expanded judicial review of an arbitral award for 
de novo review of law (but not facts) was enforceable.
175
  Again, the court did not engage 
in any searching analysis but it simply concluded that Hall Street limited its holding to 
the FAA and thus was not applicable to the Connecticut arbitration statute.
176
 
4. Texas 
The most recent departure from Hall Street happened in 2011 when the Texas 
Supreme Court (Texas Court) decided Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn.
177
  In many respects, 
the Texas Court’s decision parallels the decisions of the California and Alabama Supreme 
Courts.  There are, however, two notable differences in the analysis. 
First, although the Texas Court recognized that the statutory grounds for vacating 
an award under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) and FAA are virtually identical, it 
hooked its conclusion that the TAA permits parties to contract for expanded review on 
“excess of authority.”178  According to the Texas Court, the U.S. Supreme Court 
mistakenly overlooked this ground for review in the FAA, which can encompass 
situations where the “parties have agreed that an arbitrator should not have authority to 
reach a decision based on reversible error – in other words, that an arbitrator should have 
no more power than a judge.”179 In the Texas Court's view, this express statutory ground 
for review coupled with the underlying purposes of the federal and Texas acts – “‘to 
ensur[e] that private agreements are enforced according to their terms” – rendered Hall 
Street’s analysis and conclusion flawed.180 
The second notable feature of Nafta has to do with its handling of the preemption 
question.  Unlike the agreements at issue in Cable Connections and Raymond James, the 
agreement in Nafta was silent about whether it was to be governed by state or federal 
law.
181
  Accordingly, the Texas Court had to figure out how and why to apply Texas law 
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to it.  The Texas Court’s solution was to say that, effectively, both the FAA and the TAA 
applied, concurrently.
182
  Because, in the Texas Court’s analysis, the FAA did not 
preempt the TAA, and because the TAA allowed for parties to contract into expanded 
judicial review, it did not matter if the parties chose Texas or federal law to apply to the 
agreement.
183
 
5. New Jersey 
New Jersey is the only state that validates party freedom to contract for expanded 
judicial review by statute: “nothing in this act shall preclude the parties from expanding 
the scope of judicial review of an award by expressly providing for such expansion in a 
record.”184  This statutory provision was passed before Hall Street and was included “to 
make it clear that parties may expand the scope of judicial review by providing for such 
expansion in a record, following the ruling of Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick 
Associates, Inc., 135 N.J. 349 (1994).”185   
Interestingly, however, the court in Tretina did not actually hold that parties could 
contract for expanded judicial review, but instead, in a rather convoluted decision, 
elevated a prior concurring opinion to the status of the “current standard” for judicial 
review of arbitral awards in New Jersey.
186
  That concurrence had stated in a rather off-
handed way that: 
  
For those who think the parties are entitled to a greater share of justice, 
and that such justice exists only in the care of the court, I would hold that 
the parties are free to expand the scope of judicial review by providing for 
such expansion in their contract.
187
 
 
Making it clear just how much of a “side” comment this was, the Chief Justice went on to 
quip that he doubted that many would include such expanded review provisions and, if 
they did, “they should abandon arbitration and go directly to the law courts.”188 
 Because its origins are so murky, it is difficult to discern what policies underlie 
the rule.  Nonetheless, regardless of its questionable genesis, the statute is clear: parties 
may contract for expanded judicial review of their arbitral awards under New Jersey law. 
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C. A Back Door Sneak Attack?: States with More Intrusive Judicial Standards of 
Review of Arbitral Awards 
While most states continue to interpret their arbitration laws essentially the same 
as the FAA, as the previous section shows, there are signs that this might be changing.  In 
addition to the five states that have parted ways with Hall Street in terms of the 
permissibility of contractual expansions of judicial review, a handful of states have 
interpreted their arbitration laws in ways that provide for more intrusive judicial review 
than is allowed under the FAA.  
Some states, for instance, have embraced a manifest disregard of the law and fact 
standard of review.
189
  Others allow for review of either law
190
 or fact
191
 but not both.  
Accordingly, at least a handful of states seem to have embraced the freedom that Hall 
Street suggests they have to construct standards of judicial review that are different from 
and in many cases more intrusive than the exclusive standards of the FAA. 
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH HALL STREET’S RELIANCE ON STATES TO ADVANCE 
PRIVATE PROCEDURAL ORDERING IN THE CONTEXT OF EXPANDED JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
There must have been a moment, at the beginning, were we could have 
said –  no. But somehow we missed it.192  
 
As it stands, parties who wish to contract for expanded judicial review of their 
arbitral awards must do so against a backdrop of interlocking statutory frameworks, state-
versus-federal conflicts, and a constant deluge of confusing and often confused state and 
federal court decisions.  While Hall Street might have opened “other avenues” for parties 
who want the security of appellate review of their arbitral awards, those avenues look an 
awful lot like a nearly incomprehensible maze of winding side streets, dead ends, and one 
ways.   
This Part considers the problems posed by Hall Street’s invitation for more state 
law involvement in the enforcement and review of arbitral awards.  It begins by 
surveying some of the most significant doctrinal doubts posed by such involvement.  It 
then considers how parties are likely to respond to the doctrinal uncertainty, particularly 
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in light of the fact that many of the benefits that used to be available only in arbitration 
are now obtainable in litigation through other forms of procedural contracting.  
Ultimately, this Part concludes that the trend of commercial parties leaning away from 
arbitration to resolve their domestic disputes with one another is likely to continue and 
even accelerate so long as Hall Street’s invitation for greater state law remains good 
law.
193
  Hall Street neither meaningfully fosters party autonomy nor provides the 
efficiency of clear-cut finality.  
A. Doctrinal Problems 
“The idea of states serving as laboratories for testing alternative approaches to 
perceived problems is too well known to require amplification here.”194  But whatever 
benefits attached to federalism generally, Supreme Court precedent in the context of 
arbitration law has been decidedly anti-federalist.
195
 At least since Prima Paint Corp. v. 
Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., it has been established that the provisions of the 
FAA preempt inconsistent state laws in cases in federal court.
196
  Eighteen years later, the 
Court went further, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, and held that Section 2 of the FAA 
also applies in state court and preempts any conflicting state laws.
197
  But the Court has 
also stated that the FAA does not occupy the field of arbitration law.
198
 Moreover, it has 
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at least suggested that other provisions of the FAA, including Sections 3 and 4, which 
deal with stays pending arbitration and actions to compel arbitration, might not apply in 
state court.
199
 
The rather confused state of preemption outside of Section 2 renders Hall Street’s 
invitation somewhat questionable.  It seems beyond cavil that in any federal court 
proceeding, all of the terms of the FAA apply, unless, perhaps, the parties have specified 
that state law will govern.
200
  It is not at all clear, however, that parties can specify that 
state law will govern if that law permits parties to contract for expanded judicial review.   
As Professor Christopher Drahozal has compellingly pointed out, the authority for 
such opting into state law draws most of its force from Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. 
Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.
201
  But the Court in Volt did 
not say that parties could opt out of the FAA; instead, it said only that parties could 
incorporate state law as a term in their arbitral contracts.
202
  By so doing, parties can 
transmute state laws that would otherwise be preempted into an enforceable term of their 
arbitration contract.  If this “incorporation-by-reference” reading of Volt is correct, then 
parties that chose a state law allowing for contractually expanded judicial review are 
really just incorporating such expanded review into their contracts, which Hall Street 
expressly says that they cannot do.
203
  The only way that the Supreme Court could allow 
parties to successfully resort to state law, at least in federal court, in order to effectuate 
their preference for expanded review would be for it to hold that Volt permits parties to 
opt out of FAA Sections 9 and 10.  Such an extreme reading of Volt, notwithstanding the 
dicta in Hall Street, seems a stretch. 
Of course, many arbitral enforcement proceedings occur in state rather than 
federal court, so perhaps the problems with realizing Hall Street’s invitation in federal 
courts do not matter all that much.  Indeed, at least according to the courts in Cable 
Connections, Raymond James, and Nafta, FAA Section 10 is merely procedural and does 
not, therefore, preempt state arbitral review laws.
204
  The proposition that Section 10 is a 
procedural provision that should not apply in state court rests on the premise that the law 
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of review and vacatur “does not challenge the determination that the parties had an 
enforceable arbitration agreement.”205   
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that review and vacatur rules could 
easily undermine the very goal of finality that the Court in Hall Street held to be the 
“essential virtue” of arbitration.206  Although the current status of state laws, as Part III 
demonstrated, might not pose a significant threat to the finality of arbitral awards, the 
potential for such a threat exists and some states already seem to be moving towards 
review standards that are much more intrusive than those provided by federal law.
207
  
Accordingly, it is far from certain that, if pushed, the Supreme Court will stick by its 
dicta in Hall Street and back away from the sine qua non of the decision: limited judicial 
review ensures the sanctity of the arbitral process. 
In short, even though Hall Street comprehends a greater role for state law in the 
enforcement and review of arbitral awards, and it does so with the goal, I have argued, of 
furthering private procedural ordering, doctrinal complications might well pose an 
insuperable barrier to such a role.  At the very least, these doctrinal complications have to 
raise the suspicions of any parties wanting to take advantage of Hall Street’s invitation. 
B. Legal Uncertainty and High Transaction Costs 
There are a number of reasons, of course, why parties choose to arbitrate.  At 
bottom, however, arbitration purports to be the ultimate form of representativeness: both 
the process and the content of the dispute are based on negotiation between the parties.  
The flexibility of arbitration enables parties to define the scope of the dispute and to 
specify the form and substance of the proceedings that will resolve it. Contracting parties 
may, thus, construct a dispute resolution mechanism that optimally aligns their incentives 
with their preferred contractual norms.  In this sense, as I have already suggested, 
arbitration can be seen as the apotheosis of private procedural ordering.
208
   
Given the significant potential benefits of arbitration, the fact that commercial 
parties are leaning away from using it to resolve their domestic disputes with one another 
might, on first glance, be puzzling.
209
  Recent empirical evidence confirms, however, the 
trend.
210
  This evidence suggests that the principle reason for the trend has to do, in fact, 
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with limited appeal rights.
211
  Indeed, when Hall Street was decided, several amici argued 
that parties would “flee from arbitration if expanded review” was not open to them.212  
The Court was not sympathetic, saying that it could not tell the future,
213
 but it seems 
that, four years on, the amici were right. 
Of course, some of the decline in the use of arbitration might stem from more 
general economic factors.  After all, “because the litigation process receives government 
subsidies, sophisticated parties can be expected to agree to arbitrate only when arbitration 
has a large cost (or other) advantage over litigation.”214  In the wake of the financial 
crisis, businesses might be more sensitive to costs, which are not necessarily lower in 
arbitration.
215
 
 I suggest, however, that, consistent with the arguments in Part II, parties desire 
the freedom to tailor their dispute resolution processes in ways that optimize their joint 
welfare.  For a period of time, arbitration was the only game in town.  Parties faced a 
binary choice between accepting the public court system and its attendant procedural 
rules or they could opt out and resolve their disputes in arbitration.  Private process, 
however, “has migrated in surprising ways into the public courts: despite public rules of 
procedure, judicial decisions increasingly are based on private rules of procedure drafted 
by the parties before a dispute has arisen.” 216  Procedural contracting offers commercial 
parties many of the advantages that once seemed the exclusive prerogative of arbitration 
while still providing them with the right to appeal, a right that the empirical evidence 
strongly suggests many commercial parties highly value. 
While arbitration has arguably become more like litigation,
217
 litigation has 
become more flexible like arbitration.  The comparative advantages that arbitration once 
offered have become smaller, and, at the margins, commercial parties are accordingly not 
seeing the “large cost (or other)” advantages that they once might have.218 
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Hall Street’s invitation for parties to turn to state law to give them the flexibility 
that they crave does not help.  In fact, it makes matters much worse.  It does not help 
because, as the previous section argued, a high degree of legal uncertainty shrouds the 
ultimate enforceability of contractually expanded review provisions under state law.  
Moreover, the inconsistent and differing constructions of state laws – with different 
limitations and scopes – makes uncovering the right state law to apply to an agreement 
difficult and expensive.  Legal search costs coupled with uncertainty mean that parties 
cannot rely on Hall Street’s dicta to give them the private procedural ordering advantages 
that they want. 
Worse, the possibility that state laws, with differing and potentially more intrusive 
judicial review standards might haunt arbitral awards that parties would prefer to leave 
settled could well chase away commercial parties who would have otherwise stuck with 
arbitration.  After all, as the Court in Hall Street quite rightly recognized, one of the great 
advantages of arbitration can be its finality.  Even in the absence of a right to contract for 
expanded judicial review, many parties might have preferred arbitration, but Hall Street’s 
inelegant effort to provide for procedural contracting through state laws has the 
unintended consequence of casting a pall over finality as well as practically undermining 
party autonomy. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court in Hall Street, I have argued that 
less party freedom to contract for expanded review of arbitral awards under the FAA does 
not equal more stability for arbitration.  Although Hall Street is best understood not as a 
break from but rather a continuation of the Court’s strong support for private procedural 
ordering, the case manages to undermine party autonomy while simultaneously 
threatening its goal of valuing finality.  By pushing for greater state involvement in 
procedural contracting, at least with respect to judicial review of arbitral awards, the 
Court further unsettled an already fraught area of law – federal preemption in the context 
of arbitration.  Accordingly, even if some states allow for contractually expanded judicial 
review of arbitral awards, parties who want to take advantage of such provisions are 
hampered by uncertainty and high legal search costs.  Perhaps more significantly, if states 
take on a greater role in establishing standards of judicial review for arbitral awards, the 
possibility exists that such standards will actually undermine the finality of awards.   
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